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CHILDREN ON THE FRONT LINES OF AN IDEOLOGICAL WAR: 
THE DIFFERING VALUES OF DIFFERING VALUES 
A. SCOTT LOVELESS* 
The specter of eleven and twelve-year-old children wearing army fatigues 
and carrying AK-47s is a scene most of the world would like to consign to 
history forever.  For several decades now, the United Nations and numerous 
non-government organizations (NGOs) have sought to eliminate the use of 
child soldiers in armed conflict.  It is ironic, therefore, that children should 
now be found on the front lines of another kind of battle, an age-old 
ideological struggle, as proponents of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child1 seek to convince the United States to join virtually every other nation by 
ratifying this convention. 
The primary issue runs much deeper than simple cultural preferences 
regarding differing approaches to family law and child welfare.  It might be 
framed thus: should the United States – a nation whose Constitution depends 
on the interplay of morality and law – be bound to a treaty premised on the 
strict separation of morality and law?  Americans, and especially America’s 
lawyers and judges, need to understand why this distinction is of utmost, and 
increasingly critical, importance. 
This paper will present a framework for understanding the relationship 
between law and morality, discuss the role of codified law within that 
framework, then discuss the CRC in the context of the entire “rights-based 
approach” to law currently in vogue with many Member States and NGOs at 
the United Nations, of which the CRC is only one manifestation. 
 
* A. Scott Loveless, J.D., Ph.D. serves as Executive Director of the World Family Policy Center 
and senior professional faculty at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, in 
Provo, Utah. 
 1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted November 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 43 
(entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. 
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THE LONG-STANDING DEBATE BETWEEN NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVISM 
 
Of all the dispositions and habits 
which lead to political prosperity, 
religion and morality are 
indispensable supports . . . .  It is 
substantially true that virtue or 
morality is a necessary spring of 
popular government.  . . .Who that is 
a sincere friend to [popular 
government] can look with 
indifference upon attempts to shake 
the foundation of the fabric?2 
 
The jurists who believe in natural law 
seem to me to be in that naïve state of 
mind that accepts what has been 
familiar and accepted by them and 
their neighbors as something that 
must be accepted by all men 
everywhere. . . . [B]eliefs and wishes 
have a transcendental basis in the 
sense that their foundation is 
arbitrary.3 
 
These quotations from George Washington and Oliver Wendell Holmes 
distill the positions of two ever-opposed camps.  One side sees values and 
morality as arbitrary and having no place in law.  The other thinks them 
fundamental.  One thinks the other naïve, the other thinks the first 
unknowingly undermines free democracy.  As the quotations attest, each 
position is defended with intelligence and logic, although each camp is 
skeptical of the reasoning, if not the motives, of the other.  The one point of 
agreement between them is that no middle ground exists on this ultimate 
question, though people may find ways to disagree more or less civilly.  Moral 
values either matter in society, or they do not. 
John Locke, John Witherspoon, and the other “natural law” philosophers 
posited an essential connection between law and morality.  Later, England’s 
Utilitarians – Bentham, Austin, and others – began inquiring into the difference 
between “the law that is” and “the law that ought to be.”  The debate has since 
centered on whether a set of moral principles or guidelines exists that defines 
and provides context for good law or whether law itself defines morality. 
Those on the side of a moral guideline often favor “natural law,” the 
assumption that an ultimate, natural good exists external to the human 
invention of law, and that this natural good dictates fundamental principles of 
right and wrong.  Because it affects all human relationships – whether between 
family members, strangers, fellow citizens, or sovereign nations – this natural 
morality determines the success or failure of positive (government-created) 
law.  If not consistent with this natural good, positive law is not morally valid.  
 
 2. George Washington, Farewell Address, AMERICAN DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 19, 1796, 
available at http://www.liberty1.org/farewell.htm. 
 3. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1919). 
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At best, positive law will only approximate the justice of natural morality.  At 
worst, it will abuse and eventually self-destruct. 
Those who reject the concept of natural law, on the other hand, assume that 
good is arbitrary.  Known as positivists, such thinkers believe that good can be 
created by people coming together to decide what is right and what is wrong.  
Since no overarching morality pre-exists, the only basis for determining that 
one “good” is better than another is to embody it in positive or codified law.4  
What is lawful constitutes good, per se.  What is unlawful is, for the present, 
considered bad.  General public attitudes serve as guiding principles, in a kind 
of majority-rule approach to moral direction reflected today in what is called 
moral pluralism or political correctness. 
One difficulty in the discussion between these philosophically opposed 
camps is that positive law is easy to define and identify, whereas natural law’s 
“ultimate good” suffers from multiple definitions and a general vagueness.  
Positivists are content for law to have little, if any, moral content as long as it 
brings order to society.  Their straightforward approach with its minimalist 
ideas of what “ought to be” is easily understood and appeals readily to human 
rationality.  Natural law proponents, on the other hand, often seek a seemingly 
elusive truth on which to base their reasoning.  They get by largely by pointing 
out the inadequacies of pure positivism, not being able to say with much 
exactness what should constitute or define the moral backdrop of law. 
A well-known example of this schism is the debate between Professor H. 
L. A. Hart, advocating legal positivism, and Professor Lon L. Fuller, 
advocating natural law, found in the 1958 Harvard Law Review.5  Hart’s 
distinction between “the law that is” as the “core” and “the law that ought to 
be” as allowing interpretation in law through the “penumbral” meanings of 
words, provides an exceedingly narrow definition of “ought to be.”  He allows 
only for courtroom flexibility, leaving judges free to “legislate” in the sense of 
allowing words in enacted law to alter in meaning as society changes.  Fuller 
disparages Hart’s positivist position, urging that what law “ought to be” 
implies a consistency between law and a non-legal sense of right and wrong.  
Fuller argues that law should have an “internal morality” to keep it from 
becoming immoral.  His concept of “immoral law,” to the pure positivist, is 
oxymoronic.  However, according to Fuller, it is possible for law to become 
 
 4. Throughout this paper, in order to avoid confusion between the customary “positive law” 
and “positivistic law,” I will use the phrase “codified law” to refer to the written law established 
by government in the context of a natural law system such as the United States.  Unless clarified 
otherwise in a specific instance, “positive law” will refer to the analogous black letter law arising 
within a positivistic legal system. 
 5. H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L REV. 593 
(1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630 (1958). 
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immoral precisely because the only moral obligation positivism recognizes is 
obedience to the law, beyond which, in Fuller’s words, “[t]he fundamental 
postulate of positivism” is that “law must be strictly severed from morality.”6 
But even Fuller is hard pressed to provide much precision to the character 
of the connection between law and morality other than acknowledging its 
existence and its importance.  He usefully notes that any law, including 
positivist law, provides order, even if it is unjust or immoral in some way.  
Good order, however, is provided by “law that corresponds to the demands of 
justice, or morality, or men’s notions of what ought to be.”7  Yet, 
understanding this connection between codified law and “the demands of 
justice or morality” is crucial in evaluating the future implications of 
ratification of the CRC. 
THE SPECTRUM OF PERSONAL MORALITY AND ITS NATURAL CONSEQUENCES 
Both law and morality are concerned with relationships between people.  
Law, whether we mean natural law or positive law, sets forth acceptable modes 
of interaction between individuals or groups.  Morality determines whether 
those same interactions are right or wrong against a standard of “good.”  More 
precisely, codified law provides rules to keep people from doing one another 
direct harm.  While morality also has this object, it subsumes not doing harm 
in a list culminating ejustem generis with “love thy neighbor.”  Legally, not 
harming is the sole standard.  On the moral scale, not harming is a minimum 
standard, because the goal is to love others, and one cannot simultaneously 
love and do harm.  Thus, morality encompasses a striving to help one another, 
a forging of relationships on levels of which law takes little cognizance.8 
Most people living in a stable society recognize the need for individuals to 
obey codified law.  Most people also realize that “not harming” is insufficient, 
that some level of “doing good” is also requisite if individuals are to thrive.  
Yet, how people incorporate into their actions this sense of duty to law and 
doing good beyond obeying the law varies greatly.  The personal moral codes 
they develop and live by fall along a larger spectrum of morality, with 
implications in terms of their effects on the quality of interpersonal 
relationships, and in turn on society.  While it is possible to differentiate 
among these theories with finer gradations (Hudson,9 for example, breaks the 
 
 6. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 656. 
 7. Id. at 644. 
 8. Perhaps this point is best illustrated in the subject of “family law.”  Once a marriage is 
established, law has little to do with a happy, secure marriage and family.  Law generally only 
becomes involved if the family has broken down to the point of divorce, asset distribution, and 
custody issues, the general subject matter of family law. 
 9. DEAL W. HUDSON, HAPPINESS AND THE LIMITS OF SATISFACTION 111-32 (1996). 
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spectrum into roughly five categories, possibly six), for present purposes we 
can consider them as falling into three general categories: hedonism, 
individualism, and altruism. 
1. Hedonistic Morality Strives for Personal Pleasure 
Perhaps the most familiar Western statement on hedonism is that of Jeremy 
Bentham: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure.”10  However, one of the clearest statements of the 
hedonistic philosophy was provided by the ancient Greek, Aristipus: 
One should strive for nothing else but to experience as many pleasures as 
possible and as intensely as possible, for pleasures differ neither in degree nor 
in quality.  . . . No considerations should restrain one in the pursuit of pleasure, 
for everything other than pleasure is unimportant, and virtue is least important 
of all.11 
Hedonists focus on pleasure and desire satisfaction in the short term.  To 
the extent that they consider the future, hedonists do so in terms of maintaining 
their ability to continue having pleasure.  Other people are thus seen at best as 
means to the hedonist’s own ends, to be manipulated, controlled, or variously 
used toward the satisfaction of personal desire.  While this approach to people 
and relationships might be effective at the personal level for a brief time, it 
does not engender trust or confidence between people in the long term and 
frequently leads to conflict.  Hedonists often end up in disputes and experience 
tension in their relations with people who cannot or will not cooperate with 
them in their pleasure-seeking, or who appear to present obstacles when 
circumstances thwart the satisfaction of the hedonists’ desires. 
In its most radical form, hedonism considers “good” whatever satisfies 
one’s desire for pleasure and ensures the avoidance of pain in the fullest and 
most immediate manner possible, regardless of the consequences to others.  
Because this kind of pleasure-seeking can become addictive and draw one 
towards greater and greater thrills, hedonism can lead to extremes that result in 
criminal behavior.  Crimes involving physical abuse, theft, substance abuse, 
even murder, are manifestations of radical hedonism.  In less extreme forms, 
hedonism is still orectic, focused on the short-term satisfaction of desire 
regardless of the eventual consequences, because looking out for one’s own 
welfare and desires is what matters most.  Hedonists would thus be most likely 
to ignore or purposely disobey the law, requiring government to be more 
 
 10. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE 
UTILITARIANS 17, 17 (Dolphin Books 1961) (1789) (emphasis in original). 
 11. WLADYSLAW TATARKIEWICZ, ANALYSIS OF HAPPINESS 317 (Edward Rothert & Danuta 
Zielinski trans., Jan T.J. Srzednicki ed., Polish Scientific Publishers 1976) (1962). 
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involved in regulating their conduct than would be necessary with people 
holding higher codes of morality. 
2. Individualistic Morality Strives for Personal Virtue, Honor, and Public 
Peace 
The second broad category of lived personal codes having moral 
implications is “individualism,” roughly equivalent to eudaemonia, after the 
usage of Aristotle.  This philosophy considers hedonism to be serious error, as 
we can glean from Aristotle’s own words.  After referring to a life lived for the 
appetites of food and sex, he observed: 
[I]t is evident that, for a man who made such a choice as this for himself, it 
would make no difference whether he were born a beast or a man.  Certainly 
the ox in Egypt, which they honour as the god Apis, has a greater abundance of 
several of such things than many sovereigns.12 
Rather than seeking indiscriminate, short-term desire satisfaction, 
individualists seek the satisfaction of worthwhile desires,13 those desires 
consistent with the best or “divine” parts within us.  This often requires hard 
work, self-discipline, and the sacrifice of short-term desires in order to obtain 
long-term and honorable objectives, such as academic learning, skill and talent 
development, athletic prowess, or civic service.  Individualists also respect the 
fact that others should be able to seek fulfillment and have the opportunity to 
excel.  They therefore acknowledge the rights of others to pursue similar goals, 
even if they generally feel little or no obligation to assist others’ pursuits. 
To individualists, moral treatment of others may be seen in terms of the 
quid pro quo – “I’ll scratch your back if you’ll scratch mine,” in accordance 
with the moral principle of fairness or equity.  For this reason, individualists 
might expect either tangible or intangible rewards for good behavior, for 
obedience, for compliance, or for “not rocking the boat.”  This emphasis on 
doing one’s duty can lead individualists to supply the wants and needs of 
hedonistic spouses or teenaged children, but they might also be tempted to tire 
of this “duty,” coming to see this version of morality as a burden that keeps 
them from their preferred tasks and enjoyments. 
Other people are nevertheless important to individualists.  Although 
individualism is as self-focused as hedonism, the individualist’s activities are 
pursued with the object of making oneself good, respectable, even honorable, 
and so people of this philosophical position tend to live by the rules in order 
 
 12. ARISTOTLE, EUDEMIAN ETHICS 5 (Michael Woods trans., Clarendon Press 1982) 
(emphasis in original). 
 13. ELIZABETH TELFER, HAPPINESS: AN EXAMINATION OF A HEDONISTIC AND A 
EUDAEMONISTIC CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS AND OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM 41 (W.D. 
Hudson, ed., 1980). 
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not to endanger their reputations.  In this way, individualism as a moral code 
tends to moderate or at least stifle conflict and ill feelings between people.  It 
does not eliminate such feelings, however.  People may give individualists the 
honor they seek, but people are also competitors for those same honors.  
Impediments to personal achievement – such as limited funds, a lack of 
desirable jobs, and limited enrollment in an educational program – can lead to 
strained relationships due to a perception of competing for scarce resources.  
Serious crime would not be expected from a committed individualist, except 
perhaps for some forms of white-collar crime resulting from the sense of 
competition with others. 
3. Altruistic Morality Strives to Promote the Common Good and to be of 
Service 
Altruism differs fundamentally from both hedonism and individualism in 
that it is not orectically based.  It is not centered in desire satisfaction.  Where 
hedonism and individualism differ from each other by the types of self-interest 
they seek, altruism does not seek self-interest, at least not according to the 
standard definition of that term.  The “interest” of the altruist is not 
competitive as an interest apart from other people, but is cooperatively 
connected to other people.  Another’s need speaks to the altruist as a personal 
need.  Altruists perceive a commonality of interest with all people. 
Altruism as described here is consistent with the Christian concept (also 
found in Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Hinduism) of “loving one’s 
neighbor,” being “at one” with others; attained through genuine caring, respect 
for, and loving service to them.  Several philosophers have recommended this 
way of being, including, among others, Soren Kirkegaard,14 Martin Buber,15 
Jacques Lusseyran,16 Emmanuel Levinas,17 C. S. Lewis,18 and C. Terry 
Warner.19  Altruistic love is a spontaneous commitment to another’s welfare, 
the forgetting of self as distinct from the other because of the perception of a 
“common humanity,” to use Kristen Monroe’s phrase.20 
 
 14. See SOREN KIRKEGAARD, WORKS OF LOVE, 37-50 (David F. Swenson & Lillian Marvin 
Swenson trans., 1946). 
 15. See MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (1970). 
 16. See JACQUES LUSSEYRAN, AND THERE WAS LIGHT (Elizabeth R. Cameron trans., 1963); 
JACQUES LUSSEYRAN, AGAINST THE POLLUTION OF THE I: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JACQUES 
LUSSEYRAN, (1999). 
 17. See EMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY (Alphonso Lingis, trans., 1969). 
 18. See C. S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN (1943). 
 19. C. TERRY WARNER, BONDS THAT MAKE US FREE: HEALING OUR RELATIONSHIPS, 
COMING TO OURSELVES 301 (2001). 
 20. KRISTEN RENWICK MONROE, THE HEART OF ALTRUISM: PERCEPTIONS OF A COMMON 
HUMANITY 198 (1996). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
378 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:371 
 
Paldiel21 perceived the “essence of true altruism” in the following 
quotation from Johanna Eck, a German woman who had saved several Jewish 
women from the Nazis during World War II by hiding them in her apartment 
in Berlin. 
The motive for my assistance?  In an individual instance, none, especially. 
Basically, I think like this: If one of my fellow human beings is in a position of 
need and I am in a position to assist him [literally “stand by him”], then that is 
my (solemn) duty and obligation.  If I fail to provide this help, then I do not 
fulfill the assignment which life - or perhaps God? -  requires of me.  People, 
so it appears to me, form a great unity, and whenever they do one another 
injustice, they strike themselves and everyone else in the face.  This is my 
motive.22  (Author’s translation.) 
Altruists feel the needs of others as their own; they are other-interested, that is, 
they perceive the group, beginning with the family, as an extension of 
themselves.  Being of service where needed is paramount because altruists 
care about the people around them.  Altruism is natural and instinctive, rather 
than rational, but it can be rationally unlearned and also rediscovered. 
Anthropologist Dorothy Lee23 provides some insight into the altruistic 
viewpoint in her studies of the Oglala, Sioux and Wintu tribes of American 
Indians.  She demonstrates that these cultures, in which relatedness is overtly 
recognized and considered the ultimate value, a conception of “self” exists that 
is fundamentally different from the Western idea of an independent “self” 
interacting with other independent “selves.”  Instead, these cultures mediate 
the sense of an “open self” that is as natural among them as our Western 
“closed self” is to us.  This open self perceives itself as integral to the larger 
group – not as a separate individual who is merely responsible for others, but 
as a living part of the group who represents the group in him or herself. 
To contrast this assumption of social relatedness with the assumption of 
individuality common in Western cultures, Lee recalls worrying as a teenager 
about her own motives.  If she were to risk her own life to save someone else, 
would she be doing it for the sake of the endangered person or for her own 
sake “because I could not bear to live with myself if I did not try to save him?”  
She then observes: 
In a society where relatedness stems from the premise of the open self, such a 
question would be nonsense.  In such societies, though the self and the other 
are differentiated, they are not mutually exclusive.  The self contains some of 
 
 21. M. Paldiel, The Righteous Among the Nations: A New Dimension in the Annuls of 
Humanitarianism, in MUT ZUR MENSCHLICHKEIT 157-70 (G.B. Ginzel ed., 1993). 
 22. Id. at 163 (emphasis in original). 
 23. DOROTHY LEE, VALUING THE SELF: WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM OTHER CULTURES 
11-12 (1976). 
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the other, participates in the other, and is in part contained within the other.  By 
this I do not mean what usually goes under the name of empathy.  I mean 
rather that where such a concept of the self is operative, self-interest and other-
interest are not clearly distinguished; so that what I do for my own good is 
necessarily also good for my unit, the surround, whether this is my family, my 
village, my tribe . . . .24 
Lee points out that entire societies and cultures can be, and often are, premised 
on this foundational conception of social relatedness.  In such communities 
love, service, and concern are present as part of the basic social fabric, and 
what we call crime is almost non-existent.  In other words, to the extent that 
altruism is present, crime is not. 
Without question, there are aspects of moral systems – the trappings and 
unique practices and rituals of different religions, for example – that have, or at 
least seem to have, the arbitrary character about them that Oliver Wendell 
Holmes suggests.25  However, preferring one personal morality over others can 
only be seen as arbitrary if one overlooks how each moral code affects the 
quality of relationships between or among people.  Because hedonism places 
priority on short-term desire fulfillment, it tends to ignore relationships and 
alienate other people, immediately or eventually, creating conflict in spite of 
the presence of positive law. Individualism stabilizes relationships by 
tolerating others while seeking one’s own fulfillment, valuing others more for 
their contributions to or approval of one’s own accomplishments; thus it tends 
to uphold positive law by reducing and controlling conflict.  Altruism, by 
recognizing and valuing the relationships between people and seeking to be of 
service to others, builds trust, gratitude, and strong, valued bonds between 
people at a level of individual morality beyond legal requirement. This 
differential effect on human relationships at the level of the individual is at 
least a partial explanation of natural law. 
CODIFIED LAW ESTABLISHES A MINIMUM STANDARD OF PUBLIC MORALITY 
Codified law generally serves two purposes in society, and a set of laws 
exists for each.  Known in Western law as malum prohibitum or “bad because 
it is prohibited,” the first set concerns matters of regulation.  Speed limits and 
parking rules contribute to safety on our highways; laws against gathering 
artifacts in our national parks help to preserve our heritage; and laws restricting 
the use of fire protects private and public property.  These laws restrict 
individual freedom in the interest of the general public.  Generally speaking, 
however, breaking these laws is not considered wrong as a matter of basic 
morality except for the minimal moral obligation created by positive law to 
 
 24. Id. at 12. 
 25. Holmes, supra note 3, at 41. 
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obey the law.  Rather, breaking such a law is legally wrong, wrong because we 
agree to establish it as wrong.  In a system of natural law, this is the necessary, 
though well-circumscribed, place for codified or “positive law” in the 
conventional sense of that term. 
Positivists believe that virtually all law falls into the category of malum 
prohibitum.  The most extreme among them seem to feel that even laws against 
murder and rape, let alone euthanasia and adultery, are only a matter of 
common agreement and “social construction,” that they are wrong only 
because they have been defined as illegal.  However, in Western society and in 
most other cultures, we also recognize a class of crimes deemed malum in se or 
“inherently wrong.”  Seen against the backdrop of the personal morality 
spectrum just presented, these laws – which prohibit acts such as murder, 
mayhem, rape, arson, and theft – are mainly concerned with the consequences 
of extreme hedonism, where a person might decide, in effect, “What I want 
matters more than what happens to you,” or “My anger at you justifies my 
action in destroying your property or taking your life.” 
Such actions are crimes as a matter of law, but they are also considered 
morally wrong, or evil, under virtually any public standard of morality.  The 
label malum in se is, in fact, an inherent acknowledgment of natural law and 
the moral basis it provides for codified law.  In this respect, codified law 
establishes a minimum line or floor for everyone’s private moral code; it is 
created by government to establish a line below which society will not permit 
an individual’s personal level of morality to fall without punishment. 
FIGURE A 
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The relationship between natural law and codified law is represented 
visually in Figure A.  At any given time, society as a whole is comprised of 
people interacting with one another who have chosen to live by different levels 
of morality within natural law.  Some are hedonistic, some are individualistic, 
and some are altruistic.  Most of us probably vacillate within a limited range.  
The graduated vertical line in Figure A represents sublevels within each 
category on the spectrum of personal morality.  Codified laws on all subjects 
attempt to prevent people from descending below a publicly acceptable form of 
hedonism, a moral floor, as represented by the jagged line separating legal 
from illegal activity.  This line may move up or down as government modifies 
its laws of acceptable behavior.  The degree of shading is intended to reflect 
the degree of need for government regulation. 
Generally speaking, in a society allowing freedom of conscience, 
individuals can continue to advance up this line as far as they wish no matter 
what codified laws are in place; at least as of this writing, there is no U.S. law 
against moral goodness.  People are also free, of course, to move downward 
toward the legal/moral floor.  However, if too many people reject a higher 
moral code and embrace hedonism, democratic government will be stretched to 
the limit dealing with people breaching the legal line.  Anarchy would threaten, 
and under the burden of trying to enforce the legal floor, the government 
would either fail or of necessity become more restrictive.  As J. R. R. Tolkien 
observed through the eyes of Frodo and company in The Lord of the Rings 
trilogy, when they returned to the Shire and found that evil men had taken over 
the government, the supply of “everything except Rules kept getting shorter 
and shorter . . . .”26 
In the United States, natural law also provides the essential direction of 
common law principles, such as justice, fairness, or equity, that are used to 
guide the application of black letter codified law.27  Since both moral law and 
codified law seek to maintain social order, protect fundamental rights, and 
eliminate crime, they work together to achieve these common interests.  
However, once these goals are minimally achieved to the point of legality, 
codified law is finished.  It is concerned that citizens cause no immediate harm 
to each other by staying on the correct side of the line separating legal and 
illegal action.  As long as that condition is satisfied, codified law has little to 
say about encouraging people to live above the moral floor of bare legality.  As 
far as moving people upward on the scale of personal morality, codified law 
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can do little more than pass resolutions or provide incentives such as grants 
and tax breaks. 
The first problem with codified law standing alone, therefore, is that 
because government is limited as to what it can enforce, it cannot force people 
to risk their lives for each other or to do one another favors; it cannot force 
people toward moral good.  American tort law generally recognizes no duty to 
assist a stranger in peril.  Even the “Good Samaritan Doctrine,” which provides 
that a person attempting to assist someone in peril cannot be charged with 
contributory negligence unless the attempt itself increases the harm to the 
imperiled person, only protects the person choosing to render assistance; it 
does not require one to make the choice to place oneself at risk.  Codified law 
cannot say “should”; it is limited to that realm where it can only say “must.”  
Once it establishes this minimum standard, it is finished. 
Morality, with its unavoidable effects on relationships, steps precisely into 
this breach.  It provides the “shoulds” over and above law’s “musts,” urging 
individuals to ever higher levels of understanding and living in harmony with 
one another.  Codified law and morality, which together make up the natural 
law system, thus have fundamentally different but mutually reinforcing 
objectives.  Codified law exists to maintain public order, to avoid violence and 
open conflict.  To the degree that morality succeeds in helping people remain 
above the legal line of codified law, it assists government in maintaining order 
– not only because moral people cause fewer problems, but because they also 
try to solve the problems of others, voluntarily and freely, because they care.  
Recall Jean Valjean’s crime of stealing bread to feed his hungry family in 
Victor Hugo’s Les Miserables.28  Had, for example, a caring neighbor shared 
his food, Hugo would have had no story, because the government and 
Inspector Javert would never have become involved. 
STRONG FAMILIES, RELIGION, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT ARE 
MUTUALLY DEPENDENT 
Natural law’s interplay between codified law and morality also creates a 
space for family and religion to play their roles in society.  Families, for 
instance, provide the most natural vehicle for training both adults and children 
to think altruistically and thus to stay well above the line of pure legality.  
Social scientists, such as Merlin Myers, have noted a “morality of kinship” or 
tendency for family members to treat each other with more kindness and 
acceptance than non-kin typically do: 
What these theories all come down to is that the process of human 
reproduction gives rise to relationships of a special kind . . . .  Begetting and 
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bearing generate relations of parenthood, childhood, and siblingship.  These 
relations are unique in the fact that they are inalienable; i.e., they cannot be 
annulled, and they cannot be established in any other way. . . .  The domain of 
kinship predicates a kind of morality characterized by kindness and a 
predisposition to love and care.29 
Similarly, Meyer Fortes,30 in a review of observations on kinship from 
anthropology, summarizes that kin systems, i.e. families and extended families, 
are consistently governed by the “axiom of amity” or the “axiom of 
prescriptive altruism.”  The morality of the kinship group, in some natural, 
unimposed way, requires members to act voluntarily in the interest of one’s 
family members without regard for self (in the modern or Western sense of 
“self”).  In other words, members of family systems, nuclear or extended, tend 
to look out for one another, take care of each other, and generally act in the 
interest of the group rather than in self-interest. 
Myers suggests that codified law may have come into being when large 
extended families or tribes living the morality of kinship began to interact with 
strangers.31 That is, legal rules became necessary for dealing with people 
outside of the special kinship relationship because non-family members could 
not be counted on to live according to the same norms or to feel obligated in 
the same manner as a member of the family group.  In support of this point, 
Myers summarizes Fortes’ work as observing: 
[T]hat the social universe of the individual in tribal societies (and I would add, 
in our own as well) is polarized into two realms of social alignment.  On the 
one hand is the realm of kinship and the domestic domain, within which 
kinship morality, exhibited in the rule of amity, prevails.  On the other hand is 
the realm of non-kinship . . . In this realm, the morality of kinship and the rule 
of amity do not apply.  Rather, law, maximization and contract are the 
prevailing ethic.  I maintain that social life everywhere is characterized by a 
continuous process of pushes and pulls between these two social spheres.32 
Even in the West – where our concept of self and relatedness to others 
tends to be self-centered and where family members increasingly use contracts 
to govern familial interactions – many families still practice a form of altruism.  
Family members tend to feel a duty to look out for one another at some cost, 
sometimes at great personal sacrifice. It would appear that despite 
encroachment from many modern outside influences, the family naturally 
practices, teaches, and promotes basic altruistic thinking and behavior, the 
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highest form of moral law.  Indeed, I would venture to say that in every 
sustained culture in the world, family, that is, father, mother, and their children, 
extended to multiple generations, is the major repository of altruism and is 
largely responsible for the sense of caring that exists in each society.  As 
families succeed, they rear children who will likely assist and support 
government by never, or seldom, approaching the legal/moral floor. 
Religion is a second means for raising private morality.  Religions 
generally teach individuals to strive for ever higher standards of personal 
conduct, usually encouraging altruism as the ultimate goal.  They also tend to 
support strong families in training their children, and they provide moral 
teaching and social relief for those without strong families.  Religion and faith 
thus also encourage an upward moral impetus beyond mere legality.  
Christians are taught, for example, that by serving others they also serve God.  
To the extent the people take care of one another’s problems, they eliminate 
the need for government to do so.  This is undoubtedly what James Madison 
had in mind when he said, “If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary.”33 
The interplay of morality and codified law also explains why societies 
based on a relatively homogenous religious faith can maintain the legal floor of 
public morality at higher levels than can the United States – witness many 
Muslim nations, for example.  While non-Muslims might chafe under the 
perceived strictness of the laws in those countries, devout Muslims do not 
usually object because the public laws are not inconsistent with their personal 
morality.  By the same principle, a devout Christian or Jew or Hindu will 
generally have little problem with a law against illegal drug use or driving 
while intoxicated because he or she is not likely to wish to pursue those 
activities even in the absence of laws prohibiting them. 
In democratic countries like our own, government and religion are more 
mutually dependent on one another than many people realize.  Democratic 
government in a multi-cultural society cannot and should not promote a 
particular religion, nor should it persecute or outlaw any given religion, 
provided the religion is not engaged in seditious conduct.  Yet, a free, 
democratic government’s proper operation and successful continuation 
depends on a majority of its citizens being morally responsible in the manner 
taught by most religions.  Religion, in turn, cannot and should not govern, but 
it depends on government to maintain a minimum level of order so that it can 
teach moral responsibility in a generally stable society. 
Our government must be able to respect and protect the place of and 
connection between natural law morality and law without being viewed as 
thereby violating the Constitutional interpretations assuring separation of 
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church and state.  In our system, government itself is a creature of natural law 
and must itself remain within those bounds even as it governs according to 
those principles.  The different social effects of different values are real. 
The Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville, in his early nineteenth century 
study, Democracy in America,34 understood the interdependence between 
government and religion, predicting that the success of the American 
experiment with representative democracy would hinge on the success of the 
churches in maintaining the character of the people.  Too much erosion in the 
collective personal character, he suggested, would result in the eventual failure 
of America’s experiment in democracy.35  In The Abolition of Man, C. S. 
Lewis makes much the same point, couched in terms of natural law.36  He 
argues that values must correspond to truth, i.e. conform to natural law, 
allowing people to live “within the Tao” of nature.  Any other position is “a 
stance outside the Tao” and will lead to “the destruction of the society that 
accepts it.”37  To analogize, any attempt to disregard the law of gravity does 
not exempt the nonbeliever from the eventual consequences. 
Much like the ingenious system of “checks and balances” built into the 
American Constitution, government, religion, and strong families form another 
three-pillared foundation that helps maintain societal balance, each part 
providing and receiving reciprocal support to and from the others.  When any 
one of these three components is weakened, the others are threatened as well.  
It is worth noting that historically, when positivistic law has gone to immoral 
ends, religions and family ties have often become the targets of oppression and 
even persecution, largely because they were viewed as competitors for loyalty 
to government authority and its artificially imposed ideals. 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTION 
AS STATEMENTS OF NATURAL LAW 
The Declaration of Independence and the United States Constitution were 
founded on the assumption of the reality of natural law, with confidence in the 
personal morality of the people.  In the Declaration of Independence, certain 
rights were posited as foundational, preexisting government itself, granted 
inalienably by virtue of the nature of man.  The Declaration does not purport to 
provide an exhaustive list of such rights, but it mentions four: the right to life, 
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the right to liberty, the right to pursue happiness, and finally (and decisively for 
purposes of that document) the right to create a new government when the 
former government has demonstrated a long-standing failure to meet its 
obligations to its citizens.38  Notably, in connection with this last right, the 
Declaration implies a duty of loyalty on the citizenry to first try to work with 
the old government and not to exercise this right of creating a new government 
whimsically. 
These inherent rights were later supplemented with the Bill of Rights, the 
first 10 Amendments to the American Constitution. The list of acknowledged 
(not created) rights was thus augmented with the freedom of religion, of 
speech, and of the press;39 the right to assemble peaceably and to petition for 
redress;40 the right to keep and bear arms,41 not to be forced to quarter 
soldiers,42 and not to be violated by unreasonable searches and seizures,43 all of 
which are arguably derivative from or corollary to the fundamental rights 
described in the Declaration of Independence.  The Fifth Amendment added 
the right to a grand jury indictment before being charged with certain classes of 
crimes, the right against double jeopardy, the right to due process before being 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, and the right not to be deprived of 
property without just compensation.44  Other amendments acknowledged the 
right to be given a speedy and public trial,45 to confront witnesses, to have a 
jury trial with the jury as ultimate fact-finder,46 and not to be subjected to 
excessive bail, excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment.47  All of these 
rights are limitations on government relative to the people.  Finally, the Ninth 
and Tenth Amendments explicitly state that any rights and powers not 
specifically delegated from the people to the federal government are retained 
by the people or by the individual states, as the case may be.48  Again, these 
rights were merely documented in the Constitution, not created by it. 
Our government is thus one of limited powers, shackled by the 
Constitution with many restrictions.  These include limited terms of office, 
public officials standing for periodic elections, and the well-known system of 
checks and balances intended to keep one branch of government or one 
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individual or group from becoming too powerful by overstepping their 
specifically delegated authority.  Certain rights held to have been granted 
originally by natural law to the people were delegated from the people to the 
government they created.  The Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution recognize or acknowledge these rights as preexisting the new 
government and acknowledge the government’s subservience, both to natural 
law and to the people who hold the rights granted by natural law.  The citizens, 
who are only the “subjects” of their government in the specific areas delegated, 
remain sovereign in all other respects.  The government is to serve the people, 
not vice-versa, and significantly, the government is accountable to its citizens, 
its creators, and to no one else. 
However, in addition to the restrictions imposed on government vis-à-vis 
the citizens, certain restrictions on the citizens’ rights under natural law are 
also implicitly acknowledged. While the above rights are “inalienably 
granted,” an individual citizen can, under the terms of the Fifth Amendment, 
be “deprived” of those same rights under certain conditions and after “due 
process of law.”49  The inalienable nature of the grant of rights under natural 
law prevents the government from denying their existence and serves as a 
starting point in the relationship between our citizens and our government.  
Still, each citizen is required to comply with the inherent obligations that 
inescapably accompany these rights. 
Thus, after certain infractions of law, and depending on the seriousness 
thereof, an individual’s rights can be forfeited.  A civil fine is a forfeiture of 
the right to certain property; incarceration is a forfeiture of the right to liberty; 
and, in extreme cases, the death penalty is a forfeiture of the right to live, all on 
a scale measuring the seriousness of an individual’s harm to other people, the 
degree to which a convicted person constitutes a threat to society.  The people 
are therefore just as bound by natural law as is the government the people 
created.  In a natural law system, neither the government nor the people hold 
ultimate authority.  Both defer to natural law, a plane that remains beyond the 
reach of either the people or the government. 
THE “RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH” AS LEGAL POSITIVISM 
It is precisely here, on the question of where ultimate authority resides, that 
natural law and legal positivism have their fundamental disagreement.  Where 
natural law incorporates morality as a guide to codified law, subjecting the 
government to the sovereign control of the people who are also subject to the 
design of natural law, positivism insists upon the strict and complete separation 
of law and morality. The effect is to make government the entity that 
simultaneously creates rights, grants rights to the people, and then adjudicates 
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how the rights are to be interpreted and enforced.  Government under a 
positivistic system, in the persons of those in charge of government, assumes 
the place of ultimate authority, without any external guidance. 
The CRC is one of several recent international conventions emanating 
from the United Nations system, all of which were created in the model of 
legal positivism.  For the United States, ratification of any of these conventions 
means accepting an instrument in conflict with our foundation by subjecting 
our citizens and their natural law rights to authority not founded in natural law.  
While other treaties ratified by the U.S. Senate represent positive law on 
matters traditionally handled in the arena of international law – codified law 
establishing our relations with other nation states – these more recent 
conventions purport to govern subject matter that concerns the domestic 
sphere.  To fully understand the significance of these conventions relative to 
our natural law system, we must first consider their origins and subsequent 
development. 
After World War II, the countries of the world determined to avoid any 
future general conflagration as they had just experienced.  There was virtual 
unanimity that the primary perpetrators of the Nazi attempts to exterminate 
Jews and others considered undesirable by the Nazi social engineers should be 
prosecuted and held accountable for the atrocities that had been committed 
against so many innocent people.  Wehrmacht and SS officers and even 
conscripted soldiers were tried as “war criminals” for the abuses of the 
concentration camps, gas chambers, and other diabolical means that had been 
employed to accomplish Hitler’s ends. 
The prosecutors had little in the way of conventional “law” to use in these 
cases.  The defendants usually argued that they were just following orders or 
the law of the Nazi government.  The prosecutorial vehicle of choice became 
the “violation of human rights.”  Any normal human being, it was urged, 
should know that what was done to these people was wrong, regardless of any 
law or orders they were supposedly obligated to follow.  The American idea of 
“fundamental rights” helped to inform this movement, since this class of rights 
was deemed to be superior to national government, a trump to the alleged 
authority of the former German government, an inherent recognition of malum 
in se in international law.  In other words, the “human rights” that were relied 
upon in these proceedings originated in natural law. 
Simultaneously with these war crimes prosecutions, other steps were being 
taken to prevent a possible recurrence of the horrors of the recent war.  In 1945 
the United Nations Charter outlawed aggressive war between states.50  
Nineteen forty-eight saw the adoption of the Genocide Convention protecting 
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religious, racial, and ethnic groups against attempts at extermination.51  The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was also developed, guaranteeing 
government non-interference and non-discrimination in matters of race, 
religion (conscience), and ethnicity, for example, and declaring family as the 
fundamental group unit of society.52  The United States endorsed and ratified 
these early international treaties, which were in harmony with our Constitution 
and legal structure. 
Idealists soon realized that the concept of human rights, with its potential 
to supercede national authority, could be used not only to end atrocities, but 
also to create “good.”  In the positivist pattern, efforts began that were meant 
to influence national laws by embodying a constructed view of “good” in 
international documents, calling the policies thus formulated “human rights.”  
In particular, the United Nations, a gathering of minds already sympathetic to 
working toward peace and global understanding, responded to such thinking.  
Conventions were drafted on several key topics of concern, such as the CRC,53  
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW),54 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,55 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.56  Those at the UN who espouse this system of actively changing the 
domestic law of nations through the vehicle of positivistic international law 
frequently refer to these efforts as advancing “the rights-based approach” to 
law. 
As it has since developed, this human rights movement has become a 
political force of its own.  Michael Ignatieff refers to it as “the juridical rights 
revolution,” characterizing it as a revolution against the former condition of 
international law where states were considered sovereign, inviolable, and able 
to order even objectionable internal affairs in whatever way they considered 
appropriate.  He notes that this revolution comes complete with “juridical, 
advocacy, and enforcement” components.57  Through the combination of 
international law and human rights, the advocates of the rights-based approach 
hope to advance their ideas peacefully, quietly, even without the notice of most 
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people, but on an unprecedented scale.  A truly burgeoning human rights 
literature thrusts itself on the world as the solution to most human ills.58 
As noted earlier, however, the CRC and these other UN conventions are 
based on a philosophical foundation of legal positivism, similar to most 
governments in the world, but unlike the natural law foundations of our own 
government.  To many, this positivist approach seems practical, given the 
venue.  Most proponents of the rights-based approach believe, like Ignatieff, 
that discussions of the foundational sources of human rights are neither useful 
nor necessary.59 The real benefit of positive law, they suggest, is that 
potentially divisive foundational arguments can be avoided, as long as 
agreement on content can be achieved.  Reaching agreement on content, they 
believe, is a good approach to world peace because it preserves the world’s 
diversity and provides for moral pluralism.  One of the examples often cited is 
that every country in the world except two, the United States and Somalia, 
have ratified the CRC.  This apparent agreement is often cited as 
demonstrating that agreement on content can be achieved, even among some 
amazingly diverse cultures, but there are several flaws with this assertion. 
First, the seemingly near-universal acceptance of the CRC is uniform only 
in appearance.  Many countries ratified the CRC with expressed, documented 
reservations.60  The ratifying Muslim countries, for instance, have uniformly 
expressed the reservation that in the event of conflict between the CRC and the 
Sharia (the general statement of Islamic law), the Sharia would take 
precedence.61  In other words, the appearance of agreement on content is only 
superficial, and the disagreement centers on the question of ultimate authority 
and the foundational sources of the human rights the convention purports to 
create. 62 
 
 58. Many books have been written advocating the use of human rights as a vehicle to 
accomplish world peace.  See e.g. GRENVILLE CLARK & LEWIS B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE 
THROUGH WORLD LAW (1966). 
 59. IGNATIEFF, supra note 57, at 54-55. 
 60. See United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status 
as of 31 December 2000, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/19 (2001) at 276-86. 
 61. For example, Iran’s first reservation to the CRC states, “The Islamic Republic of Iran is 
making reservation to the articles and provisions which may be contrary to the Islamic Shariah, 
and preserves the right to make such particular declaration, upon its ratification.”  Id. at 280.  
When pressed on this point by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in January, 2002, the 
representative of Qatar explained that in the view of his country the CRC was entirely compatible 
with the Sharia.  He continued, however, to state that if the CRC were ever to be interpreted in a 
manner inconsistent with the Sharia, the latter would prevail – a disturbing interpretation to those 
who view the CRC as part of a new, revisionist view of the world. 
 62. Committee members often emphasize to the country reporters that “the Convention is 
about change.”  (Direct quotation from several members of the Committee on the Rights of the 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] CHILDREN ON THE FRONT LINES OF AN IDEOLOGICAL WAR 391 
 
Next, laying aside foundational discussions in favor of positivistic law 
based in moral pluralism is supposedly evidence of value-neutrality, but no 
such thing as value-neutrality truly exists.  Values are inevitable in government 
and in human interaction, even if they are hidden.  To claim there is no 
dominant value, for example, is to say that all values are equal, which in turn 
elevates “tolerance” to the position of a de facto ultimate guiding principle, or 
value.  In other words, one value – tolerance – is inherently not equal, but is 
placed above all other values. 
However, this misguided use of the word tolerance can itself lead to 
abusive intolerance.  If tolerance becomes the ultimate moral principle guiding 
law, there remains only a short step to say that other values don’t matter and 
therefore we should – no, we must – stop acting as if they do.  Such a view 
endangers free speech and freedom of conscience to any who might want to 
teach a different highest value, such as altruism.  When subject to a guiding 
standard of tolerance, altruism, individualism, and hedonism come to be 
regarded, as a matter of law, as of equal value in society.  Certain notions of 
“sin” and “repentance,” for instance, could become illegal to advocate against 
or for, respectively, because it might offend the “human rights” of those whose 
behavior was once considered sinful.63  Moreover, once the line of legality has 
been lowered and the “human rights” label has been attached to everything 
above it, changing the law to move the line of publicly acceptable morality 
back up a notch or two would become extremely difficult, because doing so 
would deny a (positivistic) “human right.”  Restoring freedom of speech and 
religion on these issues would be virtually impossible.64 
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This illustration demonstrates another flaw in thinking that the discussion 
of the foundational source of rights is not important, the glossing over of 
distinctions between various classes of rights.  A vital aspect of the U.S. 
system is that, whereas fundamental rights preceded government and cannot be 
infringed upon by government, there is nonetheless a broad range of subject 
matter within which the Congress and the states are free to legislate.  Thus, 
beyond the “inalienably granted rights” under natural law, a second class of 
rights results from government enactments, such as the “rights” obtained by 
military veterans to enjoy certain tuition benefits, the right to obtain a 
homestead patent to federal land, the right of qualified citizens to receive 
Medicare and Social Security benefits, and so forth.  Ownership of land, being 
conditioned on reasonable taxation, falls into this category. 
Once an entity or an individual satisfies the requisite conditions established 
under law to obtain these rights, known as property interests or “entitlements,” 
the rights so acquired must be respected by the government and by third 
parties.  The government is free, however, to modify the conditions for 
obtaining such rights or to repeal a statutory scheme creating such rights to 
prevent new rights from becoming established under a given law.  The 
homestead laws, for example, have been repealed, although the private chains 
of title emanating from previously issued homestead patents remain valid.  The 
government can also grant certain conditional regulatory rights, better 
described as “privileges,” such as the right to a driver’s license, a permit to 
harvest timber, or to graze livestock on state or federal lands.  These “rights” 
are always conditioned on the holder continuing to meet established standards.  
For instance, the right to drive a motor vehicle on the public roads is revocable, 
always conditioned on maintaining a satisfactory driving record. 
In positive law, however, because no foundation exists other than the law 
itself, no right is sacrosanct.  All “rights,” as creatures of legislative enactment, 
are essentially equal in character, equal in susceptibility to repeal or 
modification.  In consequence, the rights language of these conventions blurs 
the distinctions, so vital under the Constitution, between fundamental rights 
under natural law, procedural rights, entitlement and property rights, and 
privileges.  Similarly, if rights language expands to include health care, equal 
education, or adequate housing, or equal income, for example, as government’s 
obligation to guarantee outcomes, the “rights-based approach” becomes 
 
western European countries before the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, proposing 
to protect sexual orientation against discrimination.  The proposal was tabled until the following 
session.  Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation, 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 59th Sess., Agenda Item 17, at 2, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/L.92 (2003). 
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indistinguishable from radical socialism.  The Constitution seeks to guarantee 
equal protection and equal opportunity, not equal outcome.65 
Because the new UN conventions seek to extend international law into the 
domestic sphere through the vehicle of human rights, they simultaneously 
weaken traditional notions of national sovereignty and dilute and impoverish 
the original value and role of fundamental rights.  Paradoxically, the rights-
based approach dilutes fundamental rights under natural law, making them the 
creation of positivistic law and adding many political concepts potentially or 
actually at odds with natural law, while simultaneously seeking to preserve 
their trumping power over subsequent contrary legislation. 
If every legal right or privilege, perhaps even the right to a driver’s license 
(and I have seen this claim asserted66), is equivalent to a fundamental right, 
nothing is really a fundamental right any longer.  Either that, or any legal 
subject matter covered by human rights language will no longer be susceptible 
of discretionary legislative action, for how can a mere Congress or legislature 
override the “human right” to a driver’s license, or the “human rights” of a 
child, or the “human right” to government-guaranteed health care, housing, or 
education, should a later legislature wish to amend the system or adopt a 
different approach? 
Finally, favoring the positivist approach in lieu of a foundation in natural 
law ignores the danger of placing ultimate authority in the government, by 
definition a small and elite group of fallible human beings.  Whether elected 
officials, descendants of a specific lineage, those empowered by money, those 
with military authority, or a group of academics and appointed officials, any 
governing minority elite group will, in the name of some value or “good” such 
as tolerance, also tend to impose a cultural/legal ceiling on the moral spectrum 
in addition to its moral/legal floor.  This ceiling will adjust itself to the 
personal moral code of the elite group or leader, often in the range of 
individualism, although there is nothing to prevent it from being hedonistic. 
Even though the governing elite could be benign, even well-intentioned, 
their lack of foundation in natural law is problematic.  The sincerity of such 
convictions does not change the effect of these agendas on the lives of people.  
This danger is compounded by positivism’s belief in a strict separation 
between law and morality, which would tend to make natural law a target for 
 
 65. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
 66. Anonymous E-mail advertisement (January 28, 2003) (on file with author) (stating in 
part, “Need a driver’s license?  Too many points or trouble?  Want a license that can never be 
suspended or revoked? . . . The United Nations gave you the privilege to drive freely throughout 
the world! (Convention on International Road Traffic 1949 and World Court Decision, The 
Hague, Netherlands, January 21, 1958).  Take advantage of your rights.  Order a valid 
International Driver’s License that can never be suspended or revoked.  Confidentiality assured.  
No one is turned down.”). 
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elimination, rather than a natural good.  But no redefinition of “good” can 
change the fact that a moral spectrum does exist, together with its natural 
effects, and that our children and their children will ultimately suffer under any 
law at odds with natural moral law.  As soon as a principle becomes more 
important than a person, there is danger to the citizens.  We should think twice 
about the potential for unguided, positivist-based government to take law in a 
direction inimical to natural law. 
If this eventuality seems remote in the present context, history bears a 
sobering message.  While the original UN conventions, such as the UDHR and 
genocide conventions, were drafted by people who envisioned a moral 
response to the evil of Hitler’s regime, it should give us pause that positivistic 
law is what Hitler so easily and effectively wrested to accomplish his designs.  
In the attempt to impose his version of “good” on the world, Hitler subverted 
law that lacked moral guideposts.  Such concerns might be dismissed if Hitler 
were an aberration.  But even a brief recollection of recent history discloses 
major instances where positive law, unhinged from notions of the morality of 
natural law, was used to enforce a government-defined “good” on citizens of a 
given country or on neighboring countries, with disastrous consequences. 
Ralph Hancock67 presents an example of the kinds of problems that can 
arise from a false or incomplete grasp of the natural law foundations of human 
rights.  His article thoughtfully discusses the premise that the French Terror of 
1793 and 1794, that period captured by the image of the falling guillotine 
blade, was the result of the inadequate incorporation of natural law into the 
French Revolution.  France’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen 
instead employed positivistic law to enforce a newly invented version of good, 
the one envisioned by Robespierre and the Jacobins. 
Despite the common claim of both the American and French revolutions 
that they were based in the natural rights of man, their differing respective 
understandings and implementations thereof affected the two countries in 
distinctively different ways.  Hancock describes the French Declaration as 
having been founded on a view of human nature “stripped of all inherently 
social and transcendent dimensions,” and notes that “[t]heir theories founded 
respect for no humanity except that which they proposed to create.”68  Any of 
“the people” who disagreed with the state’s ideal could be (and were) dealt 
with as enemies of the state, and were guillotined, shot, and drowned en masse, 
be they men, women, or even children.69 The premise of the American 
 
 67. See generally Ralph Hancock, Robespierre and the Rights of Man: The Terror of 1793 
Sprang from the Theories of 1789, POLICY REVIEW, Summer 1989, at 38. 
 68. Id. at 43. 
 69. Id. at 38. 
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Revolution, by contrast, with its Declaration of Independence and eventual Bill 
of Rights, was 
[C]onsiderably richer, more subtle, and more informed by experience than that 
which guided the French.  It gave place, notably, to largely traditional 
conceptions of honor, both political and “sacred.”  An appeal to nature was 
held to be compatible with “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind” – to 
the moral standards of a humanity that already existed and did not have to be 
created.70 
The American Revolution, in other words, was founded on respect for the 
people as they then existed, both base and noble, acknowledging faults, but 
placing faith in the moral system in which the people believed.  Its founding 
documents gave place for individual moral strivings without presuming to 
create and impose a new definition of goodness toward which the citizens 
should be aspiring.  Its government was designed to protect its citizens from 
outside threats to peace and security, from criminals among the citizenry, and 
significantly, from itself and the accumulation of government power.  Beyond 
these basic freedoms, however, the founding documents did not guarantee 
outcome in any individual case; they sought to provide equal opportunity, not 
equal distribution of wealth; access to education, not equality of result.  They 
counted on a major degree of self-reliance among the people and on parents to 
do their duty by their children. 
On the moral spectrum, the primary function of the new government was 
to establish a floor or base level of public morality, codified in criminal and 
other laws, then to step aside and allow people the fundamental right to 
“pursue happiness,” as long as their pursuits did not harm others.  It protected, 
in today’s terms, the “negative freedoms:” the freedom of the people from 
government interference, such as freedom from oppression, freedom from 
governmental taking of property without just compensation, freedom of 
religion (conscience), of speech and of assembly. 
The American experiment, which married natural law and private 
conscience with the representative democracy form of government, is now 
more than 225 years old and still largely successful.  The French, however, 
experienced 15 regime changes in the ensuing 76 years after the storming of 
the Bastille.  From Robespierre and the Jacobins, to the Thermadoreans and 
Napoleon Bonaparte, a modicum of stability was achieved only after the Third 
French Republic was founded in 1870. 
Hancock’s point, to attempt a summary, is that when government takes it 
upon itself to define human good and then change the people, requiring them 
by force of law to conform to an imposed ideal rather than allowing them to 
follow conscience and change themselves, it oversteps its bounds and becomes 
 
 70. Id. at 43. 
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a threat both to its own people and to other countries.  Witness further the 
Germany of Hitler, the Russia of Lenin and Stalin, the Cambodia of Pol Pot, 
the Uganda of Idi Amin, the Chile of Augusto Pinochet, the Serbia of Slobodan 
Milosevic and, as more recently observed, the Iraq of Saddam Hussein.  
Government as combined moral theoretician, instructor and enforcer can 
become fearsome indeed, hence the importance of understanding the 
foundations of human rights in natural law.71  Hancock’s subtitle captures the 
problem succinctly: “The Terror of 1793 Sprang from the Theories of 1789.”72  
The question of the source of human rights, far from being inconsequential, 
would appear singularly critical. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN INFLUENCE ON DOMESTIC LAW 
Equipped with a strong Constitution based solidly in natural law, some 
might think the U.S. system of government is safe from the positivist 
influences of a simple international treaty or convention.  There may appear to 
be no immediate harm in ratifying the CRC, yet the threat is real.  First, we are 
already fighting a serious battle with positivism within our own legal system.  
The Hart/Fuller debate continues, with Hart’s position gaining ground.  One 
reason for this trend among lawyers is perhaps provided by Professor Mary 
Ann Glendon: 
[A]merican legal education for much of the twentieth century has placed heavy 
stress on the distinction between law and morality.  In a laudable effort to 
teach students to keep their personal views or prejudices from interfering with 
their duties as officers of the law, law schools often unintentionally promoted 
the notions that morality was essentially arbitrary or unknowable; and that law 
and morality were not only distinguishable, but entirely separate.73 
Thus, even though many law students never take the esoteric subject of 
jurisprudence, where they might encounter the Hart/Fuller debate, the 
positivistic view is often advanced as a matter of professionalism.  Legal 
education may have in this way facilitated a shift toward positivism in the 
American legal community.  Many, of course, still sense the connection to 
natural law, and, like Glendon, speak of criminal law as a “repository of moral 
norms.”74 
Justice White observed in Bowers v. Hardwick that “[t]he law . . . is 
constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially 
 
 71. One might suggest that the concept of “separation of church and state” can be seen as a 
two-way street, keeping religions out of direct government, but also preventing government from 
playing God. 
 72. Hancock, supra note 66. 
 73. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 85 (1991). 
 74. Id. 
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moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts 
will be very busy indeed.”75  He supported this point by observing that, “[t]he 
Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with 
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the 
language or design of the Constitution.”76  I understand him to be alluding 
generally to what is known as “judicial activism,” exhibited in cases such as 
Roe v. Wade,77 but I submit that such activism is least justifiable when it 
appears to deviate from the Constitutional design in natural law. If 
Congressional action can be held unconstitutional for violating the parameters 
of the Constitution, then court action should most certainly be similarly 
circumscribed. 
Aside from our purely domestic struggles with positivistic law, there is a 
danger that the positivism of current international law might work its way into 
our legal system in a similar way, that is, through our court system.  Even if the 
United States Senate does not ratify the CRC or any of the other conventions, 
the supporters of the rights-based approach are attempting to employ the tool 
of “customary international law” in the courts to accomplish the same ends, 
that is, the idea that if a practice or policy is accepted to a sufficient degree 
internationally, then it is binding even on non-ratifying countries.78  A federal 
district court in New York, for example, recently purported to enforce the CRC 
in an immigration case, despite express contrary federal law and despite the 
fact that the United States has not ratified the CRC.79 
 
 75. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).  While the actual holding in Bowers has 
now been overturned, Justice White’s philosophical point remains true.  We might also expect his 
prediction regarding court dockets to be accurate. 
 76. Id. at 194 (emphasis added). 
 77. Indeed, one of the most troubling readings of Roe v. Wade is that, by means of legal 
positivism, it removed abortion as a legitimate subject of moral debate in the state legislatures and 
created a new fundamental right out of whole cloth, certainly not in keeping with natural law and 
its moral ties between rights and obligations; Justice Blackmun’s exercises of the right of privacy 
notwithstanding.  The same holds for Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).  By positivistic 
fiat, and under the guise of the “penumbral” right of privacy, the Supreme Court has elevated 
private, consensual sodomy from the realm of being subject to state regulation to the stature of a 
fundamental right. 
 78. See Richard G. Wilkins, The Impact of UN Conference Declarations on International 
and Domestic Law, 2001 BYU WORLD FAM. POL’Y F. 1, 5 (2001) (historically, the notion of 
customary international law dealt only with long-standing practices of nation states relative to 
each other.  Recently, however, attempts are being made to broaden this idea to include internal 
national policies relating to human rights).  Of even greater concern, Justice Ginsberg is reported 
as having openly supported the idea that the Court should look outside our borders for guidance 
in interpreting the Constitution.  “Ginsburg: Rulings in other countries are relevant here.”  
Concord (N.H.) Monitor, August 4, 2003. 
 79. See Beharry v. Reno, 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 596 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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Full implementation of the rights-based approach, whether through 
ratification or through judicial activism, would be expected to soon replace 
conventional tort law with “human rights violations,” enforceable not only 
against the government, but also against individuals who “violate one’s rights.”  
This is the “third-party effect” of many provisions of these treaties and the 
interpretations thereof being advanced within ECOSOC’s conferences.  I can 
only see such efforts to override our democratic processes via international law 
as a subtle attack on our democracy itself. 
While this assertion may sound like an overreaction, in fact the later 
generation of conventions, like CEDAW and the CRC, are already 
demonstrating how the positivist law roots of these conventions can become 
distorted under the influence of special interest groups.  Their subsequent 
interpretative documents contain increasing amounts of positivistic language 
recognizable as the “rights talk” of special interest groups who were unable to 
accomplish their political ends concerning sexual expression, women’s rights, 
and sexual preference through the democratic process in the United States.  
These groups appear to be seeking to redirect the law to advance an agenda, 
i.e. to impose their view of “good” on others through treaties and conventions 
as well as customary international law. 80  If successful, these efforts will in 
 
 80. See CRC, supra note 1, art. 18, 1577 U.N.T.S. at 60 (article 18 states in relevant part that 
“[t]he best interests of the child will be [the parents’] basic concern.”); see also UNICEF, 
IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK FOR THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 227-28 
(1998) (responding to the U.S. objection to the use of international law to create obligations on 
parents, rather than States, by explaining this assertion as having “a direct bearing on the actions 
of States, because it should underpin all legislation on parents’ rights” to eliminate the 
presumption of parental ‘ownership’ of children” and the implicit assumption “that parental rights 
over children could be exercised for the benefit of the parents alone”).  Aside from the red herring 
character of this assumption, this statement makes clear that any country ratifying the CRC is 
expected to modify its domestic laws to conform to these positivistic, international standards; see 
also UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MANUAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORTING 427 (1997) (stating that “[s]tates have to adopt measures to ensure and respect [the 
right of child participation].  On the one hand, they are naturally required to reflect it in the 
national legislation, ensuring that there are effective opportunities for children to have a say, to be 
heard, and thus influence decisions.  Law can in fact play an important role both in safeguarding 
this fundamental right, and in influencing attitudes of the population at large”); see also United 
Nations Division for the Advancement of Women, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, at www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/ (last visited Feb. 25, 
2003) (describing CEDAW as “defin[ing] what constitutes discrimination against women and 
set[ting] up an agenda for national action to end such discrimination.  It goes on to set out the 
effect of ratifying CEDAW: “[b]y accepting the Convention, States commit themselves to 
undertake a series of measures to end discrimination against women in all forms, including: - to 
incorporate the principle of equality of men and women in their legal system, abolish all 
discriminatory laws and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination against women; - to 
establish tribunals and other public institutions to ensure the effective protection of women 
against discrimination; and – to ensure elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] CHILDREN ON THE FRONT LINES OF AN IDEOLOGICAL WAR 399 
 
effect remove from the field of democratic consideration and lawmaking 
several subjects that are often debated but have not yet been adopted in U.S. 
law, such as mandated full “equal rights” for women, an effort that failed as a 
proposed Constitutional amendment but is now being advanced as a principle 
of international law. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States is being asked to ratify a Convention that, ostensibly, 
will make life better for our children.  But it comes with no deference to 
natural law, the very foundation of our Constitution and the true best interest of 
our children.  In sum, neither the President, the Senate, nor the Supreme Court 
has the delegated authority from the citizens of the United States to, in effect, 
transfer their (the citizens’) ultimate sovereignty over such issues to any other 
entity inside or outside the United States.  Neither do they have the delegated 
authority, singly or collectively, to alter the underlying principles of natural 
law relied upon in the Constitution by ratifying an international convention 
based in a fundamentally different theory of law. 
Any effort to bind the United States and its citizens to such a convention or 
treaty would elevate non-elected, policy-recommending committees of the 
United Nations to a form of directing and governing status over domestic 
concerns that belongs in the hands of our citizens.  It would also subject us to 
legal oversight by authorities not of our own choosing and not in any 
meaningful way accountable to us.  It would be a step toward subjecting the 
American people to the very form of government at the global level from 
which our founding fathers worked so hard to protect us at the national level.  
This action could eventually lead to a subversion of the Constitution and a 
denial of its natural law foundations. 
Ratification of the CRC would not be merely an act of joining into a 
specific treaty; it would also constitute a joining into an international 
movement, a movement inherently at odds with the foundational premises of 
our Constitution.  No government, much less our own, should be about the 
business of imposing the ideals of a minority elite on the people.  Our 
government, at least, should be protecting the true fundamental rights of the 
people as granted inalienably by natural law, first by recognizing and honoring 
those rights itself as the limited government of those people and second by 
 
persons, organizations or enterprises.”).  The point here is that moral standards are being defined 
positivistically in a UN Convention, and doing so by avoiding the democratic process.  
Ratification of any of these conventions means abandoning the legal structure already developed 
in a country and adopting the rights-based approach in its place, even to the extent of establishing 
potential causes of action against third parties where none previously existed. 
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regulating individuals who harm others.  All other government functions are 
secondary to these. 
There is yet another important reason why the United States should not 
ratify the CRC: We should not do so precisely because the rest of the world has 
done so.  In 1776 and 1788, the idea of forming a government based on 
inalienable rights naturally vested in a people who, in turn, assigned limited 
rights to their new government, was a novel concept in the world.  Since then, 
it has seen remarkable success.  Yet its premise in and full reliance on natural 
law remains almost alone as a theoretical system of government.  For all of our 
flaws, being the one influential country in the world with a people and a 
government anchored to natural law may enable us to serve as a sort of world 
conscience, an anchor to the natural laws of justice and morality to assist the 
rudderless ships of world positivism from drifting too far toward oblivion.  
Perhaps our foundation will be enough to enable other countries to avoid 
another Robespierre or a like-minded committee or group of judges such as the 
Jacobins, another Hitler, another Stalin or Lenin, or other similar idealists.  
These people all “meant well” according to their own personal definitions of 
“good,” but in attempting to impose their version of good on the people, they 
ended up brutalizing those who disagreed or otherwise did not fit within their 
vision of ideal order.  The United States has been remarkably free of this type 
of leader for more than 200 years.  Children should not be used to test a global 
experiment based in a rights culture that seems to be losing track of our 
natural, personal duties and obligations to others, when the system we have in 
place has worked so well and the proposed pattern has failed so often. 
Do we really want to ratify, at the federal level, an international convention 
that would effectively remove important aspects of appropriate child 
nurturance (e.g. choice of values) from the purview of parents, the state 
legislatures, and the electorate?  Do we really want to train up the next 
generation to be self-focused on their “positive rights” in lieu of their “negative 
freedoms” from government intrusions coupled with their private, personal 
affirmative moral obligations to each other?  More generally, do we really 
want to dilute the idea of fundamental rights by conflating them with all other 
legal rights and entitlements, in the process rendering all such rights 
substantively immune from amendment?  Do we really want to abandon our 
roots in natural law?  For the United States, at least, these would be tragic steps 
backward. 
Our children already face a world in which political correctness and similar 
supposedly value-neutral (oxymoronic!) ideas permeate their experience.  In 
The Abolition of Man, C. S. Lewis lamented that such assumptions in the 
education of children resulted in “[a]nother little portion of the human heritage 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] CHILDREN ON THE FRONT LINES OF AN IDEOLOGICAL WAR 401 
 
[being] quietly taken from them before they were old enough to understand.”81  
The “rights-based approach,” including the CRC, constitutes a major effort to 
consolidate such ideas not only in education, but in codified law, before any of 
us are allowed to understand, let alone ponder our options.  Our children, the 
supposed beneficiaries of the CRC, would be the ultimate casualties in this 
quiet ideological battle, the CRC a Trojan Horse.  For the sake of the children, 
the United States should not ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
 
 
 81. LEWIS, supra note 18, at 11. 
